

# **The Rise of Renewables and Competition in Electricity Markets**


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**Autoridade de Concorrência**

**Lisbon, 8 February 2017**


# Decarbonising our economies



Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy

Source: EC (2011)


# Steep cost reductions for onshore wind



Global levelised average costs of electricity from large-scale onshore wind 1983-2017


Source: [IRENA \(2017\)](#)

# Electricity from renewables has become competitive with most fossil fuels




Global levelised costs of electricity for large-scale renewables 2010-2017

# Future costs reductions expected



Levelised costs of electricity for wind, solar and concentrating solar, 2010-2020

# Renewables are growing everywhere



Cumulative solar PV capacity by region, 2006-2016


# This Talk

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- Renewables: a game changer
- Impact of renewables on competition
- The need for a new market design
- Designing electricity auctions

The new challenges introduced by renewables require (more-than-ever) a **close interaction between regulatory and competition agencies**


# Renewables: a game changer





# A more fragmented market structure

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


Breakdown of ownership patterns for renewable generation capacities in Germany, 2012

Source: Fabra et al. (2014)

# Renewables depress electricity prices

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Wholesale electricity prices in MIBEL versus the share of renewables in the mix, January 2018

# Renewables depress electricity prices


Which are the drivers of electricity market prices?

Variable	MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
	Day-ahead prices	Day-ahead prices	Day-ahead prices	Day-ahead prices
Carbon price	0.22***	0.22***	0.19***	0.19***
Natural gas price	0.42***	0.42***		
Share of renewables	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.12***
Import	0.16***	0.16***	0.15***	0.18***
Electricity demand	0.23***	0.24**	0.44***	0.54***
Oil price			0.33***	0.39***
R2	65%	68%	51%	64%
Country Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estimation Method	FMOLS	DOLS	FMOLS	DOLS

Day-ahead Electricity Prices in 13 EU countries, 2007-2014


Source: European Commission (2015)

# Which part of the price reduction is due to stronger competition?




**The price reduction depends on the impact of renewables on market power**

# Which part of the price reduction is due to stronger competition?



**The price reduction depends on the impact of renewables on market power**

# Which part of the price reduction is due to stronger competition?



**The price reduction depends on the impact of renewables on market power**

# Effects of renewables on competition

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- Research hypotheses:
  - Renewables mitigate market power because of...
    - More fragmented market structure
    - Uncertainty about which plant will set the market price (pivotality status)
  - Potential countervailing effects because of...
    - Risk aversion
    - Adverser selection (winner's curse)

# Renewables mitigate incumbents' market power in sequential markets

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Ito and Reguant (2016) "[Sequential Markets, Market Power and Arbitrage](#)"

- Ito and Reguant (2016) study MIBEL
- Forward price premium between day-ahead and intraday markets
- Role of renewables in arbitraging price differences and mitigating incumbents' ability to exercise market power across markets



# Forward premium in MIBEL: day-ahead vs intraday markets





Figure 3: Market Clearing Price in the Day-ahead and Intra-day Markets

This figure shows the average market clearing price (Euro per MWh) in the day-ahead and intra-day markets, in which the horizontal axis shows hours for electricity delivery. Day-ahead market tends to exhibit prices that are on average higher than in the subsequent sequential markets.


# Over-selling/buying day-ahead: fringe firms versus dominant firms

Panel B: All Power Plants



# Over-selling/buying day-ahead by wind farms: fringe firms versus dominant firms

Panel A: Wind Farms




# Need to re-think market design

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- Shift of focus from the short to the long-run
- Need to de-risk investments
- Auctions for long-term contracts
  - Renewable energy
  - Back up capacity
- Liquid spot markets
- Important role for System Operators
- Market integration through interconnections

# The renewable auction revolution



● North America ● Latin America ● Europe ● Middle East, North Africa and Turkey ● Sub-Saharan Africa ● Asia

**Global Tendered Projects by Bid Price and Capacity, 2014-2016**

Source: GTM Research

# The design of auctions for renewables can have a strong impact on competition

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Auction design choices impact competition both in the auction as well as when bidding in the wholesale market

1. Which **contract** for renewables?
  - Feed-in-tariffs versus fee-in-premia
  - Differences in price exposure imply differences in:
    - cost of capital, types of bidders, impact on wholesale bidding...
2. Which **technologies** should compete? Technology neutrality?
3. Which **auction format**?
4. Which **participation requirements**?
5. Which **penalties** for default?

# Regulation and Competition

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- Market design decisions typically adopted by regulators
- Sub-optimal focus on competition concerns
- If design flaws lead to weak competition (e.g. markets in congested areas), competition authorities can do little to limit abuse

This calls for a **closer interaction between regulatory and competition agencies** when designing markets

**Thank You for your Attention**

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[www.eco.uc3m.es/nfabra](http://www.eco.uc3m.es/nfabra)